

Weapons to NATO
NSA/M 94

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

SECRET

August 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Control of Nuclear Weapons in NATO Europe

1. Secretary McNamara intends to speak to the President about a study which he proposes to set up under General Partridge on command and communications problems related to control of nuclear weapons.

2. It would be helpful if the President could make these points when Secretary McNamara raises the subject:

a. It would be useful for the proposed study to focus particularly on measures to assure adequate control of nuclear weapons in NATO Europe during the Berlin crisis.

b. This means that the study should deal with problems of custody and deployment, as well as command and communication.


c. It would be useful if the State Department could be clued in on the study to insure that its concerns about Allied problems and attitudes are fully reflected in the outcome.

3. The background of this matter is as follows:

a. The President directed that a study be undertaken of measures to assure against unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in NATO Europe when he acted on the Acheson Report about NATO in April. That directive called for State Department participation in this DOD study. This led to some internal DOD studies, which are generally considered to have been inadequate by all concerned, including the Secretary of Defense.

b. The President recently directed that DOD study safeguards against unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in Europe again, as a sequel to NSC ~~discussion~~ discussion of the Berlin crisis. As a result, Secretary McNamara discussed this question with General Norstad during his trip to Paris; the discussion was inconclusive.

c. Secretary McNamara has now decided to set up a group within DOD to study the problem intensively. He has remanded to the General Counsel of the Defense Department the task of defining the group's terms of reference. To date the terms seem to have these defects: (i) they do not focus adequately on Berlin; (ii) they relate only to command and communication, and do not take account of other



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measures -- notably more secure custody, and more restricted deployment -- which are also needed to safeguard against unauthorized use; (iii) they do not provide for State participation which will help to balance some of the more parochial Joint Staff views about this problem.

d. Paul Nitze's people have been trying to remedy these defects in the terms of reference. The General Counsel is still new to the problem. The State Department is backing up Nitze's people; but all this is probably hidden from McNamara's gaze. A boost for the above views by the President would therefore be most helpful.

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*Letter from 11/16
Lindbergh, trans
Thompson to NATO*

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS

There are three aspects of this question, frequently confused with each other, in relation to possible negotiations with the Soviets. These are:

(a) The Federal Republic's renunciation of the production of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the context of the Paris Agreements of 1954;

(b) Non-transfer of custody over nuclear warheads as reflected in US national legislation and as a continuing principle of US national policy most recently in the US Declaration on Disarmament: A Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, submitted to the UN General Assembly on September 25;

(c) The withholding from the armed forces of the Federal Republic of all nuclear weapons or components thereof, including delivery systems.

The US has not considered (c); it is not proposing to denuclearize the [redacted] in the sense of taking away from it those nuclear capable delivery systems now in its possession or intended for delivery under agreed NATO programs. This point can be clearly emphasized to the Chancellor, whose thinking is probably not too precise on the distinction between the three categories listed.

As to (a) above, we have taken the position in the Ambassadorial Group that, if the context seems appropriate, we might be willing to join with the Soviets, the United Kingdom, and France in noting with approval the fact that in 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany renounced production in Germany of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons (as these weapons are defined in Annex II to Protocol III of the Brussels Treaties) and in declaring that they will make such efforts as might be appropriate to secure similar measures of renunciation in the remainder of Germany and elsewhere.

The position taken by the Germans, at least through Ambassador Grewe, has been that changing technology (particularly the possibility of the cheap production of enriched nuclear fuel through use of the ultrahigh-frequency centrifuge method) makes it undesirable to repeat such a commitment to the Soviets which may no longer relate to the future needs of the Alliance. This position presumably reflects a more deep-seated feeling on the part of a number of Germans, probably including Strauss and Ambassador Grewe, that in the long run the continuing application of the

US nuclear

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US nuclear deterrent to the European situation cannot be counted on, and that the Federal Republic will probably wish to develop an independent nuclear capacity at some point in the future.

On point (b), the Federal Republic opposes any understanding of the US and the UK with the Soviet Union not to relinquish control of nuclear weapons to Governments not already possessing such weapons. The German motivation here is presumably the same as indicated above, plus a possible desire not to prejudice indirectly receipt of nuclear weapons from the [redacted] should [redacted] technology develop to the point where their manufacture on a large-scale becomes possible.

We can be fairly precise with the Chancellor in this field, specifying what we believe is admissible and inadmissible. We obviously do not wish to agree to any limitations which might give the Soviets an excuse for intervention. On the other hand, declarations by the various powers concerned, as proposed in the bracketed language under III 3 (e) of the substantive quadripartite paper or in Paragraph VII of our draft Four-Power declaration (not yet shown to the Germans), would seem to avoid this. If, of course, the Western Powers can obtain a satisfactory arrangement on [redacted] within a narrow framework covering only [redacted] then there would be no need for anything in the nuclear field. On the other hand, the US would presumably not be prepared to permit negotiations to collapse purely over refusal to include provision of this kind which would merely be declaratory of fixed US national policy.

(attached) Jint BTF Folder

The President will already have received a paper dated October 20, 1961 (BTF-38) discussing in some detail the nature of the 1954 commitment of the Federal Republic regarding production of atomic, biological and chemical weapons. This establishes that the commitment of the Federal Republic in this field is not merely a unilateral renunciation but also a multilateral commitment.

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NEW YORK TIMES, November 17, 1961

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ADENAUER WANTS U.S. TO ELIMINATE NATO ATOM CURB

Feels Need for Presidential
Signal Impairs Defense
—Kroll to Stay on Job

By SYDNEY GRUSON

Special to The New York Times.

BONN, Germany, Nov. 16—Chancellor Adenauer said tonight that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be able to order the use of atomic weapons without the prior authorization of the President of the United States.

This is necessary, Dr. Adenauer said, because a situation could come about in which an "immediate decision had to be taken when the fate of all could be decided in one hour and the president of the United States can not be reached."

The Chancellor indicated that the subject of control over the use of atomic weapons would be one of the major topics he will discuss with President Kennedy next week.

In the talk he regularly holds with American reporters prior to a visit to the United States, Dr. Adenauer also made the following points:

¶Ambassador Hans Kroll will return to his post in Moscow within a few days. The Ambassador had not committed an "indiscretion" by presenting his views for a Berlin settlement to Mr. Khrushchev, the Chancellor said, though what he said "was not in total agreement with some of the views here."

The most important task facing the Allies is to restore unity among them. This takes priority over the resumption of the exploratory talks with the Soviet Union on the Berlin problem. The Chancellor will visit President de Gaulle Nov. 30 and Prime Minister Macmillan in December to help achieve a unified Allied policy.

¶The Communist-built wall between East and West Berlin must be removed. Dr. Adenauer said this in answer to a question of what West Germany considered to be "non-negotiable" with the Russians. In the context of his complete reply, however, it appeared that he meant the destruction of the wall should be a condition for any new Berlin agreement.

¶In Ambassador Kroll's opinion, Premier Khrushchev's position has never been stronger than it is as a result of the recent Russian Communist party congress.

He Gives Reason

¶The theory that the East German Communist regime could be undermined in contacts between East and West Germany is "completely false." Any attempted uprisings, Dr. Adenauer said, would be "bloodily suppressed" by the twenty Soviet and nine East German divisions in East Germany.

¶Negotiations must be held with the Soviet Union but they must be well prepared because the Russians "will not negotiate seriously with a weak partner."

Dr. Adenauer's views on the use of atomic weapons came in answer to a question on whether he was satisfied to leave control of warheads for the West German armed forces' weapons in the hands of the United States alone. The reason for the change he advocated, Dr. Adenauer said, was a military matter, not one of politics or prestige.

"We must arrange within NATO that a decision can be taken to use atomic weapons even before the president is heard from," Dr. Adenauer said.

He noted that a proposal to make the organization world's fourth atomic power, which he is trying to revive, had been made by the Eisenhower Administration. The proposal, criticized for trying to get too many "fingers on the trigger," has been shelved quietly by the Kennedy Administration. So, Dr. Adenauer said, it is still before the President.

The Chancellor did not throw any new light on the substance of the Kroll-Khrushchev talk. He strongly defended his Ambassador, disregarded the Government's previous description of the envoy's action as an "unauthorized initiative" and expressed the belief that Herr Kroll had not contributed to Allied disunity.

Khrushchev Invited Kroll

Premier Khrushchev, Dr. Adenauer said, invited Herr Kroll to a talk before the Ambassador's scheduled return to Bonn.

Dr. Kroll was ordered to report to Dr. Adenauer two days ahead of schedule after the disclosure that he had originated the views reported from Moscow as a new Soviet proposal for a Berlin settlement.

Dr. Adenauer said an ambassador had to accept an invitation from a head of state. They had had "a not uninteresting discussion" and, Dr. Adenauer maintained, Herr Kroll informed his western colleagues in Moscow the same day.

Reports from Moscow have said that Herr Kroll did not brief the United States, British and French Ambassador there until the following day.

Adenauer Quotes Premier

The Chancellor quoted Premier Khrushchev as saying to Herr Kroll: "Tell me, how can we get out of the present difficult situation?" What was unusual about the whole affair, the Chancellor said, was to find a head of state asking such a question of an ambassador.

"If Ambassador Kroll had said he was not in a position

to answer, that he must consult his Government first, he would have been justly criticized by the Foreign Ministry," Dr. Adenauer went on.

"Now he has been scolded because what he said was not in total agreement with some of the views here which he apparently did not know about."

Kroll Is Defended

Dr. Adenauer added that he was convinced that Premier Khrushchev had not tried "to lead Herr Kroll into a trap." Nor did he believe, he said, that Ambassador Kroll "consciously gave answers that were not in harmony with the views of our Western allies."

A copy of the report Ambassador Kroll sent to Bonn has been given to the United States, British and French Governments, it was learned, to allay suspicion that West Germany was trying to make a separate deal with the Russians.

Dr. Adenauer emphatically denied that Herr Kroll had suggested a new status for West Berlin without regard for Allied rights there. Nor was there any discussion about the possibility of his meeting Mr. Khrushchev, the Chancellor said.

Adenauer to See de Gaulle

Special to The New York Times.

PARIS, Nov. 16—Chancellor Adenauer will visit President de Gaulle in Paris Nov. 30, it was announced today.

Thus far, General de Gaulle has remained aloof from United States and British exploratory soundings of Soviet intentions. He believes that it is up to the Soviet Union to suggest a way out of the crisis it has created by threatening to end four-power accords on Berlin.

Solidarity with West Germany has played an important part in formation of this French attitude. But there have been indications that General de Gaulle has been even more insistent upon a stand-pat attitude than has Dr. Adenauer.

It appeared, however, that France and Germany were in agreement on the attitude to be adopted toward the wall dividing Berlin erected by the East German Communist regime.

In answer to questions yesterday Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville of France said that it would be difficult to imagine a settlement of the Berlin issue that would leave the wall standing. However, the French minister said he would not say that removal of the wall was a pre-condition for the opening of negotiations.